Environmental Economics and the Murray-Darling River System by Quiggin, John
1Environmental economics and the Murray–Darling river system
This version: 24 August 2000
JOHN QUIGGIN
John Quiggin
Australian Research Council Senior Fellow
Department of Economics
Faculty of Economics and Commerce
Australian National University
EMAIL John.Quiggin@anu.edu.au
FAX + 61 2   62495124
Phone + 61  2 82494602 (bh)
           + 61  2 62578992(ah)
 http://ecocomm.anu.edu.au/quiggin
I thank Nancy Wallace and three anonymous referees for helpful comments and
criticism. This research was supported by an ARC Senior Fellowship and ARC Large
Grant A79701116
2Abstract
Much concern about the negative environmental consequences of agricultural
development in Australia, including salinisation, waterlogging and algal blooms, has
focused on the problems of the Murray–Darling Basin. The aim of this paper is to provide
an overview of the environmental problems of the Murray–Darling Basin from an
economic perspective, and a selective survey of the relevant economic literature, including
theoretical analysis, modelling and contributions to the development of water policy.  In
attempting to understand the complex problems of the Murray–Darling Basin, an eclectic
approach drawing on externality, sustainability and property rights perspectives seems
most appropriate.
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3Environmental economics and the Murray–Darling river system
The Murray–Darling river system has long played an important role in the
Australian agricultural sector, and an equally important role in Australian thinking about
the agricultural sector. The development of irrigated agriculture was a central component
of the policies of closer settlement and national development that were adopted from the
19th century to the late 20th century. More recently, much of the concern about the
negative environmental consequences of agricultural development has focused on the
problems of the Murray–Darling Basin including salinisation, waterlogging and algal
blooms. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the environmental problems of
the Murray–Darling Basin from an economic perspective, and a selective survey of the
relevant economic literature.
The paper is organised as follows. The first section provides background
information on the Murray–Darling river system, the history of irrigated agriculture and
the main environmental problems of the Murray–Darling Basin. Next the evolution of
policy is discussed, with particular emphasis on the replacement of the River Murray
Waters Agreement by the Murray–Darling Basin Agreement and the imposition of a Cap
on diversions of water from the river system for irrigation. The major environmental
problems associated with irrigated agriculture and land clearance are outlined. The next
section of the paper deals with frameworks for the economic analysis of environmental
problems based on the concepts of externality, private and common property rights, and
sustainability. These concepts are applied to the analysis of the Cap on irrigation
diversions and to the design of policy responses to dryland salinity.
41. Background
1.1 The river system
The Murray–Darling Basin covers just over one million square kilometres, or around
14 per cent of the area of Australia, and spans four states (New South Wales, Queensland,
Victoria and South Australia) as well as the Australian Capital Territory.
Figure 1 near here
A detailed description of the system and its resources is given by Murray–Darling
Basin Commission (2000a).
Compared to other river systems of similar size, the Murray–Darling Basin is
characterised by low average rainfall and very high variability in rainfall. Because of
these characteristics, irrigation can greatly enhance the value of agricultural output.
Although there are no reliable measures of the aggregate value added for irrigated
agriculture in the Murray-Darling Basin, the Basin accounts for about 70 per cent of the
total area of irrigated land in Australia. Cape (1997) suggests that irrigation accounts for
around 25 per cent of the total gross value of agricultural output in Australia, or around $7
billion per year, implying that the share of gross output associated with the Murray-
Darling Basin would be around $5 billion per year. This is broadly consistent with the
baseline estimate of Hall, Poulter and Curtotti (1993) that aggregate gross margins for the
southern Murray-Darling Basin total about $1 billion per year.
The same characteristics, in combination with the working of the policy process,
have contributed to many of the difficulties that have arisen in resource management in
the Basin. In particular, the variability of flows has encouraged over-allocation of
irrigation water leading to problems of unreliable supplies, low residual flows and conflict
between upstream and downstream water users.
51.2 History of irrigated agriculture
Although individual farmers have undertaken small-scale irrigation from the early
days of European settlement, the history of irrigated agriculture in the Murray–Darling
Basin has been dominated by government or government-sponsored initiatives. The ideas
of ‘closer settlement’ and of ‘development’, which played such an important role in the
Australian policy debate in the late 19th and early 20th century, found a natural expression
in government support for irrigated agriculture.
Irrigated agriculture was suited to operation on the small scale associated with
schemes for closer settlement. Moreover, irrigation offered the potential for replacing
low-intensity pastoral activity with high-intensity horticultural and grain cropping,
thereby assisting the policy objective of developing Australia’s natural resources.
Economic considerations were, initially at least, subordinated to the objectives of
development and closer settlement.An important example of government involvement in
the early development of irrigated agriculture was the support provided by the South
Australian and Victorian governments to the Canadian Chaffey brothers in their
development of the Renmark and Mildura irrigation settlements in 1887.
 The Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme was the most important single
national development project undertaken after World War II. Although its primary
purpose was power generation, the Scheme's contribution to further development of
irrigation in the Murray–Darling Basin was an important part of its political appeal.
The combination of large-scale, predominantly public, irrigation projects and direct
diversions by individual farmers led to steady increases in diversions of water for
irrigation from the Murray–Darling Basin.
The intensity with which water is used in agricultural production varies greatly
depending on the commodity being produced and the irrigation techniques employed.
6Micro-irrigation techniques applied to high-value crops yield a very high return per unit of
water applied, while flood irrigation applied to pastures yields very low returns. The water
requirements for selected commodities, using the most common irrigation techniques for
the commodity in question, are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Water required for $1 000 gross profit
Commodity                                                        Water use (Ml)
Fruit 2.0
Vegetables 4.6
Dairy products 5.0
Cotton 7.6
Rice 18.5
Pasture 27.8
Source: Hall, Poulter and Curtotti (1993)
One way of interpreting Table 1 is to consider the implications of changes in water
prices for profitability. For example, if the price of water increased by $40 per Ml, the use
of irrigation for pasture would become unprofitable, and the gross margin from irrigated
rice production would fall by nearly 75 per cent. By contrast, the profitability of fruit and
vegetable production would barely be affected.
1.3 Environmental problems
The development of agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin has been associated
with a range of environmental problems, some of which are specifically linked to
irrigation while others reflect more general impacts of agriculture. The problems affecting
the Basin as a whole may be divided into five main categories: land degradation; river
water salinity; land salinity; water quality problems; and loss of biodiversity. However, it
must be noted that all of these problems are inter-related.
7First, there are general land degradation problems such as soil erosion, acid soils,
native vegetation decline, and the impact of weeds and noxious plants. Because these
problems are not specific to irrigated agriculture, or to the Murray–Darling Basin, they
will not be discussed in detail here. However, these problems must be taken into account
in formulating a response to environmental problems more directly related to irrigation.
Second, there are problems associated with salinity of river water. Irrigation tends to
increase salinity because runoff increases salt loads and because the use of water for
irrigation reduces total flows. Saline water can reduce the yield of irrigated crops and
damage water pipes and domestic appliances. Reductions in yields of sensitive crops, such
as stonefruits, are observed at salinity levels in excess of 200 EC and for citrus fruits at
300 EC. 1  The quality of water for human consumption deteriorates perceptibly when
salinity exceeds 300 EC, and water with salinity greater than 800 EC is considered
unacceptable for human consumption. The Salinity Audit undertaken by the Murray-
Darling Basin Ministerial Council (2000, p. vi) concluded that, under current policies
The average salinity of the lower River Murray (monitored at
Morgan) will exceed the 800 EC threshold for desirable drinking water
quality in the next 50–100 years. By 2020 the probability of exceeding
800 EC will be about 50 per cent.
Third, there are problems of land salinity, arising primarily from rising water tables.
Dryland salinisation is primarily associated with the clearance of deep-rooted native trees
and their replacement with shallow-rooted crops and pasture. In addition weir pools may
create a freshwater ‘dam’ that precludes the drainage of salty water into the river system.
                                                
1   The EC unit is a measure of electrical conductivity, commonly used to indicate the salinity of water. 1
EC = 1 micro-Siemen per centimetre, measured at 25° C.
8The effect is to raise the water table in the catchment in which clearance takes place, and
therefore to bring saline water closer to the surface. As the groundwaters rise, naturally-
occurring salts (principally sodium chloride) are dissolved and brought towards the
surface, where the water evaporates leaving high concentrations of salt. In addition to the
effects of salinity on crops, vegetation and wetlands, rising water tables cause
waterlogging of land and damage to roads and buildings. However, this process is not
uniform. The effect of tree clearance on water tables is greatest when trees are cleared on
recharge areas, but the resulting salinisation takes place primarily in discharge areas. The
issue is complicated by more general concerns relating tree clearance to loss of
biodiversity and to an increase in net emissions of greenhouse gases.
Fourth, there are water quality problems other than salinity, including turbidity, and
eutrophication resulting from excess nutrients such as fertiliser runoff. Eutrophication is
associated with algal blooms such the blue-green algae bloom which occurred in the
Darling River in 1991-92, and which was described as ‘the largest river bloom of blue-
green algae recorded anywhere in the world’ (Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council
1994, p. 3). These problems have been exacerbated by the effects of introduced species
such as European carp.
Finally, there are problems of biodiversity and loss of habitat, particularly those
arising from changes in the patterns of river flows, and the reduction in the volume of
water flowing into wetlands such as the Macquarie Marshes. In the last few years, there
have also been proposals to restore flows to the Snowy River, 99 per cent of which is
currently diverted to the Murray–Darling Basin through the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Scheme.
2. Policy
9Following the terminology of Randall (1981), the evolution of policy regarding the
Murray–Darling Basin may be divided into two phases: an expansionary phase, which
coincided with the operation of the River Murray Waters Agreement; and a mature phase,
reflected in the adoption of the Murray–Darling Basin Agreement. The crucial event thus
far in the mature phase has been the imposition of ‘the Cap’, a limit on aggregate
diversions of water from the Murray–Darling Basin.
2.1 The River Murray Waters Agreement
Regulation of the Murray River system was one of the first issues addressed after
Federation. A period of drought beginning in 1895 culminated in the ‘Federation drought’
of 1901–2. One result was a non-government conference held in Corowa in 1902, which
called for government action to manage the waters of the Murray River. (Murray–Darling
Basin Commission 2000b).
 A prolonged period of negotiation followed, during which the states claimed
property rights over the waters of the Murray and its tributaries. South Australia relied on
provisions of the newly-enacted Constitution under which the Commonwealth
government had authority over navigation along the Murray River and an implied
obligation to preserve flows in the South Australian section of the river. Although the
navigation rationale soon lost its relevance, South Australia’s claim of rights to some
minimum flow was consistent with doctrines of prior appropriation. The upstream states,
Victoria and New South Wales, favoured the riparian doctrine, under which landowners
are free to take water from streams flowing through their property. As the ‘Premier State’,
New South Wales claimed riparian rights not only over its own rivers, but over the entire
main stream of the Murray. Although the border between New South Wales and Victoria
was determined to follow the southern bank of the river, Victoria successfully claimed
equal rights over the river flow.
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Negotiations were finally concluded in 1915. The River Murray Waters Agreement,
to which the Commonwealth and the states of New South Wales, Victoria and South
Australia were parties, set out the basic conditions which remain in force today:
•   flow at Albury is shared equally between New South Wales and Victoria
•  Victoria and New South Wales retain control of their tributaries below Albury
•  Victoria and New South Wales supply South Australia with a guaranteed
minimum quantity of water
The agreement also provided for construction of dams, weirs and locks on the main
stream of the Murray to be managed by the River Murray Commission (predecessor of the
current Murray–Darling Basin Commission) which was established in 1917
(Murray–Darling Basin Commission 2000b). The River Murray Commission owned and
operated the structures, but this function has now been divested to a separate organisation,
River Murray Water, in line with current thinking about the desirability of separating
regulatory and operational functions.
Although it was an important example of cooperative federalism, the River Murray
Waters Agreement was limited to the management of water for irrigation and navigation.
As Clark (1982) notes most environmental issues were matters beyond the powers of the
River Murray Commission and were left to individual states to resolve.
2.2 The Murray–Darling Basin Agreement
Recent developments in policy regarding the Murray–Darling Basin reflect the
constraints associated with a maturing water economy (Watson and Rose 1980; Randall
1981). Randall argues that where the exploitation of irrigation opportunities  is in its early
stages, we observe an expansionary water economy, characterised by relatively low social
cost of expanded water use, in total and at the margin. In such circumstances, the welfare
cost of subsidies to water use is small. When the expansionary phase reaches its inevitable
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end, and a mature water economy emerges, the problem of managing the resource is
complicated by the persistence of policies inherited from the expansionary phase.
Randall’s (1981) characterisation of the main features of expansionary and mature water
economies is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Characteristics of expansionary and mature water economies
Item Expansionary phase Mature phase
Long-run supply of  
impounded water 
Elastic Inelastic 
Demand for delivered  
water 
Low, but growing: elastic 
at low prices, inelastic at 
high prices 
High, and growing:  
elastic at low prices,  
inelastic at high prices
Physical condition of 
impoundment and 
delivery systems
Most is fairly new and in 
good condition
A substantial proportion  
is aging and in need of 
expensive repair and  
renovation
Competition for water 
among agricultural, 
industrial and urban  
uses and instream 
flow maintenance
Minimal Intense 
Externality etc.  
problems
Minimal Pressing: Rising water  
tables, salinisation saline 
return flows, groundwater 
salinisation, water 
pollution etc 
Social cost of  
subsidising increased 
water use 
Fairly low High and rising 
Source: Randall (1981, Table 1)
At least until the 1960s, the Murray–Darling Basin displayed all the characteristics
of an expansionary water economy. As shown in Figure 2, the supply of irrigation water
responded rapidly to growing demand. The physical infrastructure associated with the
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Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric scheme and the associated downstream irrigation
systems was fairly new, and governments were willing to support these investments even
when rates of return were low or negative. Environmental problems and competition for
water use became evident during the 1970s. By the late 1980s, these problems were
pressing and the transition to a mature water economy was largely complete. The aging of
physical infrastructure coincided with an increase in real interest rates and increasing
pressure to reduce public debt, making governments unwilling to finance new capital
investments.
Figure 2 near here
As diversions for irrigation approached or exceeded the capacity of the
Murray–Darling river system, and environmental problems became more serious, the need
for a coordinated approach to management of the Basin as a whole became more evident.
The Murray–Darling Basin Agreement was signed in 1987. In its initial form, it was as an
amendment to the River Murray Waters Agreement. Five years later, in 1992, a totally
new Murray–Darling Basin Agreement was signed, replacing the River Murray Waters
Agreement. The Agreement was given full legal status by the Murray–Darling Basin Act
1993 which was passed by all the contracting governments. Queensland also became a
signatory, under terms set out in a Schedule to the Agreement. In 1998, the Australian
Capital Territory formalised its participation in the Agreement through a Memorandum of
Understanding.
The stated purpose of the Murray–Darling Basin Agreement is ‘to promote and
coordinate effective planning and management for the equitable, efficient and sustainable
use of the water, land and other environmental resources of the Murray–Darling Basin’
(Murray–Darling Basin Agreement 1992, Clause 1).
To achieve this, the Agreement established new institutions at the political,
bureaucratic and community levels. These are:
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• the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC);
• the Murray–Darling Basin Commission (MDBC); and
• the Community Advisory Committee (CAC).
The principal business of the institutions established under the Agreement has been
to formulate a response to the unsustainable growth in diversions of water from the Basin
for irrigation and other purposes.
The Cap
Shortly after its formation, the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council responded
to the problem of excess demand for water. In 1995, the Council introduced a moratorium
on the future growth in diversions of water from the Basin, which was replaced, from 1
July 1997 by a permanent upper limit to diversions, known as the Cap.
The Cap is defined as the volume of water that would have been diverted under
1993-94 levels of development. The Cap is not the volumeof water that was used in 1993-
94. Rather the Cap in any year is the volume of water that would have been used with the
infrastructure (pumps, dams, channels, areas developed for irrigation, management rules
and so on) that existed in 1993-94, assuming similar climatic and hydrologic conditions to
those experienced in the year in question. Thus, the Cap provides scope for greater water
use in certain years and lower use in other years (Independent Audit Group 1996). Under
the agreement to implement the Cap, each state is required to implement a management
plan for each of the catchments under its management.
2.3 The Council of Australian Governments
The development of policy with respect to the Murray–Darling Basin has been
significantly affected by agreements reached by the Council of Australian Governments
(COAG) including the National Competition Agreement. In February 1994, COAG
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endorsed an agreement for the sustainable reform of the water industry. COAG’s Water
Resource Policy called for clearer specification of users’ rights and access to water, and
the provision of water for the environment. The key objective was to encourage water use
which will achieve its highest value among both consumptive and non-consumptive uses,
while ensuring that the use is ecologically sustainable (COAG 1994). In April 1995, the
Water Resource Policy became a component of the National Competition Agreement.
The general effect of the COAG agreements is to reinforce the policy preference for
price-based and market-based solutions to environmental problems. However, the
Competition Principles Agreement also requires that a number of matters shall, where
relevant, be taken into account. The first of these is ‘government legislation and policies
relating to ecologically sustainable development’. The Australian Conservation
Foundation has supported the application of National Competition Policy to water,
stressing the requirement for sustainability. However, it is opposed to the creation of
water rights with unlimited tenure (Australian Conservation Foundation 1994), which is
arguably implicit in the program set out in the 1994 and 1995 COAG agreements. This
conflict reflects the tension between private and common property rights.
3. Analytical frameworks
A wide range of analytical frameworks have been used by environmental economists
to analyse environmental problems and propose policy responses. It is useful to distinguish
three main frameworks, based on the concepts of externality, sustainability and property
rights, respectively. The concept of externality is due to Pigou (1924). Coase (1960)
challenged the Pigovian approach and argued instead for an analysis based on the concept
of property rights. The origins of the concept of sustainability are less clear, and the range
of approaches encompassed by the term ‘sustainability’ is much broader. The concept may
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be traced back to the idea of ‘maximum sustainable yield’ prominent in biological
approaches to natural resource management, but uses of the term in economics have
diverged considerably from this starting point.
Many debates between the advocates of these different approaches remain
unresolved. An assessment of their strengths and weakness must therefore reflect personal
judgements rather than professional consensus. In this paper, it will be argued that, for the
analysis of complex problems such as those of irrigated agriculture, it is appropriate to
take an eclectic approach, using different analytical frameworks in different contexts.
3.1 Externality
Pigou (1924) sought, for the first time, to present a rigorous analysis of optimal
government intervention based on neoclassical welfare economics. An action by a firm or
individual is defined as having external effects if it directly affects either the productive
capacity of other firms or the welfare of other individuals. The key idea is that the actions
of one individual directly impinge on others, without any direct market interaction. Pigou
proposed that taxes or subsidies could be used to internalise externalities, by equating the
marginal private cost of externality-generating activities with the marginal social cost.
Many different concepts of externality have been analysed. A useful distinction is
that between point-source externalities, diffuse or nonpoint externalities and congestion
externalities. A point-source externality problem arises when a single firm generates
externalities affecting one or more other firms or individuals. In the analysis of the
problems of the Murray–Darling Basin, point source externalities are less important than
diffuse or nonpoint externalities, which arise when many firms or individuals contribute to
an external effect on one or more others.
A second crucial distinction is that between unilateral and reciprocal or congestion
externalities. Unilateral externalities arise when the actions of one party generate
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externalities affecting another, but not vice versa. To the extent that the actions of
upstream users degrade water quality for downstream users, the salinity problem may be
viewed as a unilateral nonpoint externality.
Congestion externalities arise when members of a group generate negative
externalities affecting each other. Congestion externalities frequently arise in irrigation
areas. Application of irrigation water results in rising water tables, with consequent
waterlogging and salinisation. However, because of the complex hydrology of water
catchments, such problems rarely display the complete symmetry of textbook congestion
problems. Activities such as tree clearance have most effect on water tables when they
take place in recharge areas, but the consequences are most evident in discharge areas.
Thus, to some extent, there is a unilateral externality that is generated by land users in
recharge areas and affects land users in discharge areas (who may or may not be the same
people).
The analysis of congestion externalities raises theoretical difficulties that are
difficult to resolve within the externality framework. Imposition of a Pigovian tax in the
presence of congestion may make all resource users worse off, unless the tax revenue is
returned to users. This problem is likely to result in political resistance to congestion
taxes, and may also distort incentives for locally-funded investments that enhance the
value of the resource. But unless payments to users are made in a lump-sum fashion
(which is difficult) the return of tax revenue may weaken or negate the incentive effects of
the Pigovian tax.
The externality framework is most valuable in the consideration of unilateral
externalities. Many policy problems involving unilateral externalities develop as
variations on a common pattern. An activity is initially undertaken without recognition of
any negative external effects. Over time, either because of an expansion in the scale of the
activity, accumulation of stocks of polluting by-products, or because of improvements in
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scientific knowledge, negative external effects are recognised. The policy problem now
generates a conflict between efficiency objectives, which can be achieved through
taxation or regulation of the externality-generating activity, and equity concerns arising
from the fact that investments in the activity have been made without any expectation of
such taxation or regulation.
3.2 Property rights
The property rights approach was advanced by Coase (1960) as part of a critique of
Pigou’s externality approach, with its reliance on government intervention. Coase
discussed unilateral externalities involving two parties, and propounded the famous ‘Coase
theorem’ that, in the absence of transactions costs, assignment of property rights to either
party would result in negotiations leading to a Pareto-optimal outcome.
In practice, however, unilateral externality problems are frequently characterised by
significant transactions costs, such as those arising from strategic behavior. The property
rights approach has proved more useful in dealing with complex interactions between
multiple users of a resource.
Analysis of property rights in environmental problems initially focused on private
property rights (Coase 1960; Scott 1955). Scott (1955) showed that private ownership of a
fishery would yield a socially optimal outcome whereas open access (which Scott
misleadingly referred to as common property) would not. These ideas were developed by
the ‘property rights school’ including Demsetz (1967) and Furubotn and Pejovich (1974).
However, as Randall (1983) observed, the private property rights school found great
difficulty in analysing changes in property rights. This is critical, since, within this
framework, it is only through changes in property rights structures that environmental
issues can be addressed. Randall (1983) distinguishes between two post-Coasian
traditions; a Coase–Posner tradition, following Posner (1972), which advocates flexibility
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in property rights when this would promote efficiency, and a Coase–Buchanan tradition
which emphasises security and stability of rights. Randall points out the weaknesses of the
Coase–Posner tradition.  In addition to the reduction in the value of rights, and the
associated disincentives for investment, Randall points out that instability in property
rights encourages 'rent-seeking' behaviour aimed at securing a reassignment of rights. The
Coase–Buchanan tradition is based on a contractarian theory of rights, of the type
specified by Buchanan (1977).  Following a hypothetical initial assignment of rights, all
subsequent changes would be through voluntary exchange or other consensual processes.
This approach meets Randall's objections to the Coase–Posner tradition, but involves
significant limitations of its own.
The private property rights framework provides some useful descriptive insights
into environmental problems of this kind, but very little policy guidance. The
Coase–Buchanan view, that property rights should be inviolate, is equitable only if the
initial distribution of rights was equitable. Since the initial allocation of rights over the
Murray–Darling Basin gave almost nothing to the environment, environmentalists have
sought to change this allocation. The Coase–Posner view that property rights will evolve
to take account of changing values is based on the assumption that there exists an activist
judiciary, willing to make the necessary changes through its interpretation of common and
statute law. In the Australian context, this is not a realistic assumption, and the
Coase–Posner view gives little guidance to legislators or bureaucrats regarding the way in
which property rights should be changed.
One response to the difficulties associated with the private property rights analysis
has been an increasing interest in the concept of common property. Economists in the
private property rights tradition had long used the term 'common property' as a synonym
for 'no property'. As long as this terminology was confined to the study of open access
resources, as in the work of Scott (1955), it was merely confusing. However when
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economists in this tradition, such as Demsetz (1967) were confronted  with actual
common property institutions, they readily assumed that their open access model was
applicable.
The erroneous equation of common property with open access was popularised by
Hardin's (1968) 'tragedy of the commons' description of the medieval open field system
and the accompanying argument for private property rights solutions to modern
environmental problems. The work of Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) and Dahlman
(1980) refuted Hardin's description of the open field system. This was followed by work
describing the actual operations of contemporary common property systems in less
developed countries, such as that of Jodha (1986) and Wade (1987). The concept of
common property has proved useful in the analysis of traditional irrigation systems
(Mahendrarajah 1986). In the Sri Lankan system examined by Mahendrarajah, land is
privately owned and operated, but irrigation works are common property, and access to
water during periods of drought is collectively managed. Common property ideas have
also been applied to more general environmental issues such as the management of
airsheds and river systems.
A crucial observation about common property rights is that pure systems of
common property are very rare. Systems of agricultural property rights typically involve a
mixture of private and common property similar to that observed by Mahendrarajah
(1986). In the medieval open field system, for example, privately-owned cattle were
grazed on common pastures, which reverted to private ownership in the cropping phase of
the rotation cycle.
The notion of common property has played an important role in modelling of the
Murray–Darling system by Quiggin (1988a), Hall, Poulter and Curtotti (1993) and
Sappideen, Kennedy and Dumsday (1998). These models share a common basic structure.
The Murray river system is divided into a number of subregions, which are organised in a
20
sequential fashion, from upstream to downstream. Hall et al. extend this idea by
modelling the whole Murray–Darling system as a directed network, with the
upstream–downstream relationship as a partial ordering. Within each region the allocation
of resources may be represented as a linear programming problem, with a range of
activities varying in the gross margins they yield and the intensity of water use required.
Yields are affected by salinity, usually through a simple linear relationship based on the
work of Maas and Hoffman (1977). In some cases, urban water use in Adelaide is also
modelled.
The link between regions arises from the fact that water use upstream affects the
availability and quality of water downstream. Quiggin (1988a) compared the solution
arising when the linear programming problems in each region were solved sequentially to
maximise surplus in each region, with the dynamic programming solution which
maximises surplus for the river system as a whole. Quiggin characterises the first solution
as an ‘open access’ solution and the second solution as a ‘common property’ solution.
The difference between the common property solution and the open access solution
represents the social loss associated with the upstream–downstream externality. This loss
includes not only damage caused by salinity but production opportunities foregone
because of salinity and reduced water availability. Various methods of internalising this
externality have been considered. Quiggin (1988a) considers the effect of higher water
prices, incorporating an implicit Pigovian tax. Hall, Poulter and Curtotti (1993) examine
the impact of making water rights tradeable. Both approaches yield significant welfare
improvements.
The model analysed by Quiggin (1988a) is very simple, consisting of six regions
and four crops, and is characterised as ‘illustrative’ rather than as a detailed
representation. Subsequent work has extended this simple model in various ways. Hall,
Poulter and Curtotti (1993) model more regions and crops and include market supply and
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demand. Sappideen (pers. Comm.) has developed a dynamic model with monthly steps in
place of the once-off annual model of Quiggin (1998a). Quiggin (2000) extends the
technology to allow for water-saving technology and state-contingent production under
uncertainty, based on the approach developed by Chambers and Quiggin (2000).
3.3 Sustainability
Much public discussion of environmental issues focuses on the notion of
sustainability.  So many different definitions of sustainability have been offered that
discussion of the issue is inevitably confused. However, much of the intuition behind the
term is derived from simple models of sustainable yield, derived from biological and
economic analysis of fisheries and forestry.
Analysis based on this intuition has proceeded in two quite different directions. The
first approach is to treat sustainability as a property of growth paths for the economy as a
whole. The resulting analysis may be contrasted with ‘old growth theory’ (Solow 1956) in
which natural resources did not play an important role.
Theoretical analysis of sustainability and growth begins with the proposition that
the interests of future generations should be given equal weight with our own in making
decisions affecting the long term future. This proposition was taken as axiomatic by
Ramsey (1928) in deriving his savings rule, but was dropped in most of the literature on
‘old growth theory’. Since this literature focused almost exclusively on the case of rising
living standards, the fact that future benefits are discounted merely implies a slower rate
of improvement. However, if the prospect that environmental degradation could lead to
lower living standards in future is taken seriously, the idea that the welfare of future
generations should be discounted appears inequitable, since it implies support for
redistribution from low-income future generations to the higher-income present
generation.
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In the absence of inherent discounting of utility, the discount rate (at any point an
optimal growth path) is endogenously determined by the rate of technological progress
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Howarth 1991, Howarth and Norgaard
1990). The discount rate is that given by the Ramsey ‘golden rule’
 C
·
t= YK/Kt,
where:
Ct is consumption at time 
Yt is output
Kt is the capital stock.
  = -U  (Ct)Ct/U  (Ct) is a measure of aversion to intertemporal variations in
consumption. Thus, provided the rate of technological progress is positive, the discount
rate will also be positive.
Concern about environmental degradation is reflected in the assumption that capital,
that is, technology embodied in produced goods, cannot be substituted indefinitely for
natural resources, taken broadly to include all the contributions of the natural environment
to human welfare, and agricultural production in particular (Hartwick 1977). In the
absence of substitution opportunities, it may be appropriate to apply one discount rate to
environmental goods and another to produced goods. In particular, if deteriorating stocks
of natural resources coexist with general technological progress, the optimal discount rate
for natural resources may be negative or zero even though the general discount rate is
positive.
Similar results may, however, be obtained without the need for separate discount
rates by projecting steadily rising relative prices for environmental goods. Dasgupta and
Maler (1990) argue that all of the concerns addressed by sustainability theorists can be
addressed more appropriately in the analysis of the present value Hamiltonian arising
from the solution to an optimal growth problem.
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Attempts to derive general principles from sustainability theory lead naturally to the
conclusion that unsustainable practices arise as the result of an inappropriate choice of
marginal discount rates (Quiggin 1997). Intensive agricultural industries based on
irrigation have encountered sustainability problems relating to salinity, siltation and
waterlogging. In these cases, the general approach to sustainability based on reducing the
rate of discount of future environmental benefits appears appropriate.
The second direction of development of the concept of sustainability has been a
search for specific sustainability rules analogous to the sustainable catch rule for fisheries.
Within this framework, specific practices may be classed as 'sustainable' or
'unsustainable', according to whether they satisfy the sustainability rule. A variety of
sustainability rules are discussed by Barbier (1987) and Barbier, Markandya and Pearce
(1990). The sustainability rule approach works best in the case of activities, like fisheries,
that are dependent on a specific local stock of natural capital.
In the case of irrigated agriculture, the most important stock of natural capital is the
river system and the associated watersheds. Degradation of the stock of natural capital is
reflected in rising water tables, reduced river flows and higher levels of salinity. Hence, a
sustainable set of practices is one that ensures that the river system will be stabilised at an
acceptable level of salinity, water quality and water flow.
4. Policy responses to environmental problems
Before the 1980s, most policy responses to the environmental problems of the
Murray–Darling Basin involved local measures designed to mitigate problems of salinity
and waterlogging in individual catchments. This local approach has gradually been
subordinated to Basin-wide concerns about the sustainability and economic efficiency of
practices regarding water use and land clearance in Australian agriculture, concerns which
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have focused particularly on the problems of the Murray–Darling Basin. These concerns
have been reflected in the development of policies limiting tree clearance and the
diversion of water for irrigation.
An analysis of recent developments in environmental management must be informed
both by the theoretical frameworks described above and by consideration of the
institutions of the Australian federal system. The starting point of the policy process has
been the determination of desired limits on tree clearance and water diversion based on
sustainability criteria. The attempt to satisfy these criteria has been based on a
combination of direct regulation, pricing policies justified primarily in terms of Pigovian
welfare theory, and attempts to create markets for appropriately defined property rights.
These policies may usefully be analysed in terms of the interaction between private and
common property rights and of the determination of prices that take appropriate account of
externalities.
4.1 Tree clearance and dryland salinity
The problem of dryland salinity raises problems of non-reciprocal externality.
Farmers clearing trees from recharge areas may impose externalities on others whose land
consists largely of discharge areas. In principle, these issues could be addressed through
Pigovian taxes, as proposed by Greig and Devonshire (1981). In practice, however, no
policy proposals of this kind have been considered. Hence, as is commonly the case,
externality concepts are of more value in understanding the problem than in designing
policy responses.
The sustainability framework is also helpful in understanding the problem. Fisher
(1995) discusses the difficulties of farmers facing the financial pressures of low
commodity prices, for whom there appears to be little alternative to farming practices that
will, in the long run, increase salinity and reduce the value of their own property, as well
25
as that of neighbouring farmers. Farmers in financial difficulty face high effective
discount rates, and are therefore more likely to adopt unsustainable farming practices
(Blyth and Kirby 1984; Quiggin 1987).
Responses to the perceived unsustainability of land management practices and
particularly tree clearance have taken two main forms. First, most states have imposed
restrictions on tree clearance. Second, there have been attempts to promote sustainable
practices through cooperative programs such as Landcare.
Restrictions on tree clearance represent an attenuation of the rights of landholders
who previously had unrestricted rights to clear their property. Compensation has been
paid in some, but not all, cases. Proposals for restrictions on tree clearance in Queensland,
motivated primarily by concerns about biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions, are
currently (August 2000) the subject of debate between the Commonwealth and State
governments regarding compensation. In anticipation of such restrictions, the rate of tree
clearance has increased.
Hodge (1982) analysed the case for the creation of private property rights to cleared
land, and an associated market in which such rights could be traded. The basic argument
is familiar. Assuming that the socially optimal area of cleared land has been determined,
the market in rights to cleared land will ensure that such rights are allocated to those who
value them most highly, thereby achieving any given reduction in land clearance at
minimum social cost. Quiggin (1986) extended this analysis, arguing that, in the presence
of uncertainty about optimal cleared areas, common property institutions for catchment
management would be required in addition to private rights to cleared land.
4.2 Sustainability and the Cap
The decision of the Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council in 1995 to impose a
Cap on water usage in the Basin was the crucial event in the move from an expansionary
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water economy to a mature water economy. The imposition of the Cap was a response to
evidence that the existing policy framework was unsustainable.
 In one sense, the unsustainability of existing policies is self-evident. As shown in
Figure 1, if entitlements existing in 1995 were fully developed by 2020, as was predicted
in the absence of policy change, more than 90 per cent of the average natural flow to the
sea would be diverted annually.
A more difficult problem is to assess the extent to which diversion levels and
irrigation practices are unsustainable, in the sense that, at the margin, the costs of the
long-term damage they generate outweigh the benefits of additional agricultural output.
Until quite recently, there was no clear evidence that overall salinity levels in the rivers of
the Murray–Darling Basin had increased over time; rather, they seemed to have remained
"relatively constant" (Meacham 1984). However, this is no longer the case, with studies
now showing that salinity levels are rising significantly in most rivers in the Basin
(Williamson et al. 1997), except where remedial actions have been undertaken.
The Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council (2000) estimates the costs associated
with salinity at $46 million per year. This amount is relatively modest compared to
aggregate gross margins of the order of $1 billion per year. However, maintenance of
existing policies is likely to lead to higher salinity and higher costs. Moreover, Quiggin
(1998b) argues that estimates of costs actually incurred fail to capture the full reduction in
welfare associated with externalities.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that, in the absence of cost-reflective
prices and smoothly functioning markets for water rights, water is not, in general,
allocated to the use that will generate the highest benefit. Hence, there is no unique and
well-defined measure of the marginal benefits of additional agricultural output. It follows
that an appropriate analysis of sustainability must take account of property rights and
externality considerations.
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4.3 Private property rights
The private property rights approach yields a range of useful insights into the
problems of the Murray-Darling system. Brennan and Scoccimaro (1999) apply the
private property rights approach in considering the development of water markets.
During the expansionary phase of the water economy in the Murray-Darling system,
individual irrigators obtained a variety of private rights to use water. Rights were typically
unlimited in duration, either explicitly or because they were based on licenses that were
renewed automatically.
However, rights were attenuated in various ways. First, they were not, in general,
tradeable, except through the sale of the land to which they were attached. Second, they
were contingent on the availability of adequate water. Third, the value of existing rights
was limited by the relative ease with which developers of new irrigation areas could
obtain water allocations. Hence, the property rights regime had some of the characteristics
of an open access resource.
There were some moves towards tradability of rights during the 1980s and early
1990s (Brennan and Scoccimaro 1999), but the crucial policy decision was the imposition
of the Cap.2 In part, this decision involved restrictions on the use of water rights, thereby
attenuating the private property rights of individual users. However, the imposition of the
Cap implied that, in future, no net creation of new private water rights would be
permitted. The effect, therefore was to raise the value of existing rights, to the extent that
such rights were preserved after the imposition of the Cap. Moreover, the imposition of
the Cap was accompanied by an increase in the tradeability of rights, which also enhanced
                                                
2  South Australia had already restricted the issue of new licenses, but the crucial problems of over-
allocation were in the upstream states affected by the Cap. A partial moratorium on new licenses in New
South Wales proved ineffective because of existing overallocation.
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their value. Although water rights have not been fully detached from land, and trading of
water rights remains limited, trade is likely to grow in future.
Since existing rights exceeded appropriations and the Cap precluded any increase in
appropriations (and foreshadowed the possibility of reductions in total appropriations), the
imposition of the Cap implied some net withdrawal of rights. The approach recommended
by the Independent Audit Group (1996), and adopted by the states in their implementation
of the Cap, was to create a hierarchy of rights.
 The hierarchy proposed by the Independent Audit Group (1996) is a lexicographic
ordering in which rights are ordered by their legal status, then by history of use, with
rights of a given legal status being ranked higher if there is a history of use. The legal
categories are subdivided on the basis of the existence or absence of a history of use,
leading to a system of six categories:
(1) statutory rights with a history of use
(2) ‘sleeper’ statutory rights with no history of
(3) non-statutory rights with a history of use
(4) non-statutory rights with no history of use
(5) formal promises of future access; and
(6) expectations of access based on past practices.
‘Sleeper’ rights (rights allocated to particular blocks of land, but never used) fall
into category 2, while the used and unused components of ‘dozer’ rights (partially unused
rights) are allocated to categories 1 and 2 respectively.
All rights with a history of usage as of 1993-4 fall into categories 1 and 3. It follows,
given the existence of ‘sleeper’ and ‘dozer’ rights, and some rights created after 1993-4,
that the total rights allocated under categories 1, 2 and 3 must equal or exceed the Cap.
Hence,  the total allocation of rights in categories 1, 2 and 3 must be reduced before any
rights in categories 4, 5 and 6 can be converted into access.
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There are a variety of ways in which the requirements of the Cap could be met.
First, technological improvements could reduce losses of water through evaporation and
absorption in channels, thereby permitting a smaller aggregate diversion of water to
satisfy a given set of rights to water use. Second, some existing rights could be purchased
from their holders. Third, rights with a limited duration could be withdrawn or
downgraded at the expiration of their term, rather than being automatically renewed in
line with past practice. Finally, an ‘efficiency dividend’ could be imposed on holders of
rights. This would take the form of a proportional reduction in allocations based on an
assessment of the average reduction in water consumption that would be associated with
the adoption of ‘best practice’ technology in on-farm water use.
A noteworthy feature of the Independent Audit Group’s approach is that ‘sleeper’
and ‘dozer’ statutory rights rank ahead of less formal rights with a history of use, even
though irrigators may have come to rely on the latter rights. The alternative of giving a
lower ranking to inactive rights has obvious political advantages, since those from whom
rights are withdrawn do not suffer any actual loss of income, though they lose potential
future benefits. Assuming that rights are not perfectly tradeable, there are also efficiency
advantages. In general, the fact that rights are not being used indicates that the use for
which they are allocated is of low value. Hence, the social cost of withdrawing these
rights is low.
However, the uncompensated withdrawal of statutory rights is a violation of the
general norm that property rights should be secure, and may be seen as reducing the value
of property rights in general. An additional difficulty with placing a high weight on a
history of usage is that, if anticipated, this approach creates ‘use it or lose it’ incentives,
leading holders of rights to exercise them even when the costs of doing so exceed the
benefits.
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A closely related set of issues arises from proposals to restore some proportion of
the flows previously diverted from the Snowy River. Restoration of flows to the Snowy
River implies a reduction of flows to the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers and hence
either a reduction in diversions or a reduction in the residual flow in those rivers.  A
reduction in diversions must be achieved by one of the methods considered above.
The difficulties associated with the interaction between private rights to water use
and common rights over catchments and the Basin as a whole are most acute in New
South Wales. Water use in Queensland has been growing rapidly, but from a low base.
South Australia has historically adopted a conservative allocation policy, with the result
that existing statutory rights can be accommodated within the Cap. In Victoria there has
been modest over-allocation, in the sense that, under existing patterns of water use, not all
rights could be exercised in years of very low flow.
In New South Wales, by contrast,  over-allocation has been routine. As a result,
even category 1 rights cannot be fully exercised in low-flow years. Moreover, the ratio of
‘sleeper’ and ‘dozer’ rights to active statutory rights is high. Moreover, there are
increasing diversions of water by riparian users on unregulated tributaries (those not
controlled by dams and weirs) and increasing capture of surface water through farm dams.
Given this background, a move to tradability of New South Wales water rights
without some withdrawal of existing rights would lead to allocations far in excess of the
Cap, and, in many cases, in excess of the maximum physical capacity of catchments.
These issues are discussed further in Department of Land and Water Conservation (NSW)
(1998). Further issues regarding tradeability are discussed by Crase, O’Reilly and Dollery
(2000).
The policy response in New South Wales has culminated in the Water Management
Bill 2000 introduced in June 2000. The Bill incorporates explicit recognition of
environmental externalities for the first time, and is based on sustainability considerations,
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particularly the principle that flows needed to restore adequate river health should have a
prior right over the provision of water for consumptive use.
However, the main focus is on defining private property rights in a way that is
consistent with total availability of water and efficient resource use. Except for a limited
domestic use and stock allowance, riparian rights over unregulated rivers are replaced by
a system of three categories of water entitlements available under conditions of low,
medium and high flow. In general, water rights over regulated rivers are converted from
volumetric entitlements to shares in the available flow. However, in periods of severe
water shortage, high security users, including urban water supplies, power companies and
some growers permanent crops such as vines and fruit trees will have priority over
irrigators with general security (NSW Department of Land and Water Conservation 1999)
4.4 The role of common property
The effect of combining regional management of aggregate water use in each
catchment with the expansion of trading rights is to create a mixture of private and
common property rights. Such an approach is an optimal response to the problems of
shared resources, such as catchments, where knowledge is imperfect.
In much of the property rights literature, the creation of a perfectly well-defined set
of private property rights is assumed to be the ideal policy outcome. In the case of an
irrigation system like that operating in the Murray–Darling Basin, a water property right
might be specified as a contingent annual allocation depending on a detailed specification
of the relevant states of the natural system, including initial levels of water storage,
rainfall, temperature and stochastic occurrences like algal outbreaks. Given such a
detailed specification of the possible events, there would be no need for further
intervention once the rights had been created and the market established. Equally,
however, given such detailed knowledge and a specification of the demand function, it
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would be possible for a central manager to determine the optimal allocations of water
directly.
In the real world of imperfect knowledge, the dilemma observed by Randall (1983)
is inescapable. A system of property rights must be flexible enough to permit adjustment
in the light of new knowledge, but this means that individual rights cannot be perfectly
specified. Quiggin (1988b) argues that the appropriate response to this problem is the
creation of common property rights which create a framework within which the private
property rights of individual resource users may be constrained and modified.
Dudley (1992) proposes an alternative response to the common property problem,
based on the idea of capacity sharing. Rather than annual entitlements to water,
individuals would receive rights to a certain proportion of the capacity in a given storage.
At their discretion, they could call for a release of capacity and a corresponding delivery
of water. The storage could be managed collectively by the owners or by a private or
public corporation.
Recognition of the common property aspects of the Murray–Darling Basin is most
evident in the Integrated Catchment Management Framework (Murray–Darling Basin
Commission 2000c),which
‘will identify targets that are needed for the Basin, such as water
quality and river health. These targets will help ensure that key assets in
each catchment and in the whole Basin, such as wetlands, native
vegetation, built infrastructure, recreational areas, cultural sites, high
quality drinking water and productive land, are protected. This will mean,
for example, setting targets for the levels of salinity in the water flowing
out the end of major valleys. Local communities, industries and
governments, working together, will need to decide what assets in each
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catchment should be protected, and then make sure the necessary action is
taken over future years to prevent river salinity levels rising above the
target. ’
This approach, which implies the effective creation of common property rights, is
embodied in the Water Management Bill 2000 in New South Wales.
4.5 Externalities and prices
Where users appropriated water directly from the river system, it was typically
unpriced. Users supplied by publicly-operated irrigation schemes paid for their water, but
water prices rarely covered all operational costs and included no charge for the capital
cost of the scheme or for the value of water.
Changes to water pricing have resulted primarily from the COAG agreements which
require water suppliers to charge full-cost prices and eliminate cross-subsidies. In general,
the ‘full-cost’ price has not included any allowance for the opportunity cost of water or for
externalities such as salinity (the resource abstraction charge imposed in the Australian
Capital Territory is an exception). However, political acceptance of prices covering the
full cost of irrigation works may be regarded as reflecting a compromise between forces
favouring continued subsidisation of irrigation and those favouring a higher price
incorporating Pigovian taxes on externalities.
Nevertheless, the full implementation of a system of tradeable water rights will
require the development of pricing systems that are consistent across state boundaries and
that take appropriate account of externalities. This point is illustrated by the Pilot
Interstate Water Trading Project which has required the formulation of appropriate
exchange rates between upstream and downstream water use, taking account of the
increased negative externalities arising when water use is transferred upstream. In the
Pilot Project, the exchange rate between South Australia and the upstream states is 0.9.
That is, rights to use 10ML of water in South Australia may be traded for rights to use
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9ML in Victoria or New South Wales (Murray–Darling Basin Commission 2000d). The
effect is the same as that of a Pigovian tax.
4.6 The path ahead
Economic considerations played a very limited role in policymaking during the
expansionary phase of the water economy in the Murray–Darling Basin. As the
expansionary phase drew to a close and the problems of the mature water economy
became evident, the need for appropriate economic institutions became apparent. Indeed,
there was some tendency to suggest that the resolution of the problems was a simple
matter of getting prices right (or, from a Coasian perspective, creating clearly defined
property rights).
The experience of the last decade has shown that appropriate economic institutions
are essential, but that the complexity of the problem is such that no simple policy solution
is likely to prove adequate. Concern about degradation of land, water and natural
environments, particularly in relation to the Murray–Darling Basin, is becoming steadily
more widespread. The environmental movement, in particular, is shifting its attention
from the forest preservation issues that defined the environmental battles of the 1970s and
1980s to broader issues. Government responses to evidence of rural and regional
disaffection with microeconomic reform has included a search for ‘nation-building’
responses to problems such as land degradation.
In these circumstances, the development of more sophisticated systems of pricing,
regulation and property rights (private and common) is needed merely to keep pace with
the growth of competing demands for control over land and water resources. The
acceptance of sustainability criteria in the long run will require a reduction in total
diversions of water and a return to a flow regime more similar to that which would occur
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naturally. Hence, significant improvements in the technical and allocative efficiency of
water use will be needed simply to maintain current levels of irrigation-related
agricultural output.
Concluding comments
The convergence of agricultural economics, resource economics and environmental
economics has been a notable development of the past twenty years, reflected in
institutional changes such as the replacement of the Australian Journal of Agricultural
Economics by the  Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
The problems associated with irrigated agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin
involve complex interactions between agriculture, resources and the environment. The
economic literature on the Murray–Darling Basin therefore provides an ideal illustration
of the extent to which economic reasoning derived from a range of different perspectives
can contribute to an understanding of environmental problems and to the development of
appropriate policy responses.
Economists have long debated the relative merits of approaches based on
externality, property rights and sustainability concepts. In understanding the complex
problems of the Murray–Darling Basin, an eclectic approach drawing on all of these
perspectives seems most appropriate.
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Figure 1: The River Murray and Lower Darling (Source: Murray-Darling Basin
Commission)
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Figure 2: Annual diversions from the Murray–Darling Basin 1920–95 with
projections to 2020
Source: Murray–Darling Basin Commission (2000)
